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Pursuing Justice for the Mentally Disabled
Grant H. Morris*
I.  Assessing the Competence of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases
If Michael Perlin spoke in a forest, and no one heard him speak, would he still
make a sound?  That is the question I ask you to consider as I respond to Michael’s
article.1
Lawyers who represent mentally disabled clients in civil commitment cases and in
right to refuse treatment cases, Michael tells us, are guilty of several crimes.  They are
inadequate.  They are inept.  They are ineffective.  They are invisible.  They are
incompetent.  And worst of all, they are indifferent.  Is Michael right in his accusations? 
You bet he is!
The very ethics of our profession require lawyers to represent their clients
1
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“A lawyer should represent a client competently.”  MODEL CODE OF PROF’L2
RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980).
See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-19 (1980); MODEL3
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT preamble (2003) (“A lawyer's responsibilities as a
representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen are usually
harmonious. Thus, when an opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can be a zealous
advocate on behalf of a client and at the same time assume that justice is being done.”). 
Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal4
Government: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 SO. CAL. L. REV. 951, 959-60 (1991).
SUBCOMM. ON MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES, ASSEMBLY INTERIM5
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, CAL. LEGIS., THE DILEMMA OF MENTAL
COMMITMENTS IN CALIFORNIA–A BACKGROUND DOCUMENT (1966).
Division 5 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code, entitled Community6
Mental Health Services, was added by the California Mental Health Act of 1967, ch.
1667, § 36, 1967 Cal. Stats., ch. 1667, § 36.  Division 5 consists of two parts: the
Lanterman-Petris Short Act, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000-5550 (West 1998
and Supp. 2005), and the Bronzan-McCorquadale Act (formerly the Short-Doyle Act), id.
§§ 5600-5772.5.  The Bronzan-McCorquadale Act  provides the legislative framework for
the organizing and financing of “community mental health services for the mentally
disordered in every county through locally administered and locally controlled community
-2-
competently  and to act as zealous advocates for their clients,  “pursu[ing] their clients’2 3
objectives single-mindedly, without regard to the interests of others.”   Let me just4
discuss one example to demonstrate that lawyers representing the mentally disabled do
not act competently and as zealous advocates.  In 1966, a California legislative
subcommittee issued a report that questioned the legal, moral, and practical worth of
California’s civil commitment laws and recommended fundamental changes in the
commitment system.   In response, the California Legislature enacted the Lanterman-5
Petris-Short Act (LPS), which embodied the subcommittee’s recommendations.   LPS has6
2
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mental health programs.”  Id. § 5600 (West 1998).  
The statement is attributed to Maurice Rodgers, spokesperson for the California7
State Psychological Association.  EUGENE BARDACH, THE SKILL FACTOR IN
POLITICS: REPEALING THE MENTAL COMMITMENT LAWS IN CALIFORNIA 
126 (!972).  Other writers also state that LPS has been described as the Magna Carta of
the mentally ill, but they do not reveal the source of the statement.  See, e.g., Hearings on
the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm. On Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 91  Cong., 1  & 2   Sess. 316 (1970)st st nd
(statement of Dr. Roger Egeberg, Assistant Secretary for Health and Scientific Affairs,
Department of Health, Education and Welfare); Marc L. Abramson, The Criminalization
of Mentally Disordered Behavior: Possible Side-Effect of a New Mental Health Law, 23
HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 101,105 (1972).
See, e.g., FRANK W. MILLER ET AL., THE MENTAL HEALTH PROCESS8
xvi (2d ed. 1976) (characterizing the California experiment as “innovative” and declaring
that LPS “must be considered throughout any discussion of mental health programs”).
See, e.g., David Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L.9
REV. 742, 753 (1969) (asserting that LPS “promises virtually to eliminate involuntary
hospitalization except for short term crisis situations. . . .  The procedural protections it
promises are impressive indeed when compared with commitment proceedings in other
states.”).
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.05.010-71.05.910 (West 2002).   10
-3-
been hailed as “the Magna Carta of the mentally ill.”   LPS has served as a model of7
progressive legislation, has been commended by writers  and judges,  and copied by other8 9
state legislatures.   With only some minor tinkering over the years, LPS remains the law10
today in California.  
A key component of LPS is the elimination of indeterminate commitment of
nondangerous, mentally ill persons and the creation of a conservatorship process designed
to provide continuing assistance to gravely disabled patients who need such assistance
after they have been treated in a mental hospital for seventeen days or less.  For an LPS
3
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CAL. WELF.& INST. CODE §5008(h)(1)(A) (West 1998).11
See Grant H. Morris, Conservatorship for the “Gravely Disabled”: California’s12
Nondeclaration of Nonindependence, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 201, 225 (1978).
See id. at 232-33.13
Only nine hearings were more than eight minutes in duration.  Id. at 232, n.173.14
-4-
conservator to be appointed, the court must find that the patient is gravely
disabled–defined as “a condition in which [the] person, as a result of mental disorder, is
unable to provide for his or her basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter.”   The11
LPS conservatorship is established for a one-year period, but it may be renewed upon
proof of continuing grave disability.
Eight years after LPS was enacted into law, I asked students in my seminar in Law
and Mental Disorder to observe the LPS conservatorship proceedings in the San Diego
County Superior Court and gather data on the performance of attorneys representing
individuals for whom a conservatorship was proposed.   The students observed sixty-12
three court hearings, and here’s what they reported.   Eight hearings were one minute or13
less in duration.  Nineteen hearings were between one and two minutes in duration.  Nine
hearings were between two and three minutes in duration.  Thus, more than half the
hearings–a total of thirty-six of the sixty-three that were observed–were completed in
three minutes or less.   Ironically, the LPS conservatorship hearings were of a shorter14
average duration than the 4.7 minute average of pre-LPS civil commitment hearings.
In forty-two of the sixty-three cases, counsel representing a proposed conservatee
4
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Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Is It More Than “Dodging Lions and15
Wastin’ Time”? Adequacy of Counsel, Questions of Competence, and the Judicial
Process in Individual Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L.
114, 130 (1996).
-5-
asked no questions of the reporting psychiatrist.  In most of the remaining twenty-one
cases, the lawyer asked only one question.  In only one case did the proposed
conservatee’s counsel request either the assistance of a psychiatrist or the examination of
the proposed conservatee by another psychiatrist.  There was not a single case in which
counsel for the proposed conservatee offered testimony of an independent psychiatrist.  In
fifty-six of the sixty-three cases, no questions were asked of the proposed conservatee.  In
fifty-eight of the sixty-three cases, counsel for the proposed conservatee neither proposed
alternatives to conservatorship nor even suggested that others explore these possibilities. 
In only one case did a lawyer urge that the proposed conservatee be permitted to retain his
driver’s license, and in no case did a lawyer resist the imposition of contractual
disability–the right to enter into contracts–on his or her client.  
Clearly, the conservatorship hearings observed by my students were meaningless
formalities, “show” trials, an “empty shell” to borrow words from Michael Perlin,
“offering only an illusion of due process.”   Rolling over and playing dead is not15
competent representation.  Rolling over and playing dead is not zealous advocacy on
behalf of one’s client.  
 Perhaps, it could be argued, that such attorney inaction at the conservatorship
hearing was appropriate.  Perhaps the attorney made a reasoned decision not to contest
5
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At the time of the study, private attorneys were paid only $75 for each case in16
which they served as appointed counsel for a proposed conservatee.  Morris, supra note
12, at 234.  Today, indigent proposed conservatees are represented by attorneys from the
Office of the Public Defender which contracts with the county to represent them in
conservatorship hearings.
-6-
conservatorship because the evidence of grave disability was so overwhelming that
resistance was both futile and unwarranted.  But not so.  Attorney nonperformance at trial
was a direct result of the failure of attorneys to investigate the facts and to fully prepare
their clients’ cases.  For the small fee that the county paid them,  most attorneys made16
one visit to the client in the facility where he or she was detained, ensured that the papers
in the case were in order, and made an appearance at the conservatorship hearing.  Some
attorneys did even less.  Several were observed meeting their clients for the first time at
the hearing itself.  Appointed counsel almost never attended the psychiatric evaluation of
their client that was performed a few days prior to the hearing, although they were
welcome to do so.  Most attorneys did not even examine the psychiatric report prior to the
hearing, even though the report was almost always entered into evidence upon stipulation
and was often the most significant evidence in the case supporting the appointment of a
conservator.  Some attorneys expressed concern that if they “make waves” at the hearing,
they could jeopardize their chances of being appointed to represent proposed conservatees
in future cases.
Nevertheless, one might assert, proof of inadequate performance by attorneys in
conservatorship cases tells us nothing about the performance of attorneys in civil
6
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CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5358(a) (2) (West 1998).17
Id. § 5358(b)18
Id. §§ 6000(a) & 6002 (West 1998).19
Id.20
-7-
commitment cases and in right to refuse treatment cases.  But not so.  It tells us
everything.  If an LPS conservatorship is established, the court may grant the conservator
the authority to place his or her conservatee in a mental hospital  and to require the17
conservatee to receive treatment to remedy or prevent the recurrence of the conservatee’s
condition of grave disability.   18
The statutes in California provide that a person may apply for voluntary admission
to a mental treatment facility when he or she is mentally competent to apply, or if he or
she is an LPS conservatee, when his or her conservator applies if the court has granted the
conservator the authority to place the conservatee in a mental treatment facility.  19
However much the conservatee protests, he or she is admitted to that facility as a
voluntary patient.  Although other voluntary patients may depart the facility by giving
notice of a desire to do so, LPS conservatees may depart only if notice is given by their
conservators.   However much the conservatee protests, he or she may be required to20
take psychotropic medication that his or her doctor prescribes and the conservator,
exercising a substituted judgment for the conservatee, authorizes.  Although the court, in
appointing a conservator for a gravely disabled person, has discretion to grant or to
7
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Morris, supra note 12, at 228.21
See id. at 201.22
Id. at 215.23
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withhold the placement authority, the court almost always grants that authority to the
conservator.  In each and every one of the sixty-three cases that my students observed, the
court granted the conservator this placement power.   21
Elsewhere, I characterize these conservatorship statutes as “California’s
nondeclaration of nonindependence,”  laws that allow civil commitment and coerced22
treatment without the crunch.   For LPS conservatees, there is no involuntary civil23
commitment hearing.  For LPS conservatees, there is no right to refuse treatment hearing. 
California’s so-called “Magna Carta of the mentally ill” allows carte blanche control over
the mentally ill, and attorneys representing mentally ill clients play their role–or should I
say, their roll-over–in assuring that result.  In only two of the sixty-three cases that my
students observed, did the proposed conservatee’s lawyer even question whether the
conservator should be empowered to involuntarily confine his or her client as a voluntary
patient and to require the client to submit to the administration of psychotropic
medication. Who argued, on behalf of his or her client, that an inability to provide for
food, clothing, and shelter–the criteria necessary to establish a conservatorship—does not
necessarily equate to an inability to understand the risks, benefits, and alternatives to
psychotropic medication?  Who demanded, on behalf of his or her client, that the court
8
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Morton Birnbaum is generally credited with coining the word “sanism.”  See24
Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment: Some Comments On Its Development, in
MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE 97, 106-07 (Frank Ayd
ed., 1974).
See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks”:  Sanism25
in Clinical Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 683, 683-729 (2003) (discussing the
meaning of sanism, sanist courts and lawyers, sanism and clinical teaching, and sanism
and clinical law students); Michael L. Perlin, “For the Misdemeanor Outlaw”: The
Impact of the ADA on the Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental
Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 193, 234-36 (2000) (discussing sanism as applied to
criminal defendants who claim to be mentally incompetent to stand trial or who plead
insanity as a defense to a crime);  MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE:
MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 21-58 (2000) (discussing the concept of sanism, the
roots of sanism, and sanist attitudes of the public and the legal system toward mentally
disabled persons).  This book also discusses sanism in specific contexts, such as
involuntary civil commitment law, id. at 92-98, the right to sexual interaction, id. at 167-
69, the Americans with Disabilities Act, id. at 200-03, competence to plead guilty and to
waive counsel, id. at 218-19, and the insanity defense, id. at 237-38.               
-9-
make a separate finding of fact that the proposed conservatee lacked the capacity to
understand the risks, benefits, and alternatives to psychotropic medication–the criteria
necessary to give or withhold informed consent–before it granted the conservator the
authority to order that such treatment be imposed over the conservatee’s objection?  There
were no such arguments; there were no such demands.  
II.  Why Are Patients’ Counsel Incompetent?
Michael provides us with the reason for this sorry state of affairs: sanism.  Sanism
is a word that Michael did not create,  but one that he has certainly popularized in24
various contexts in numerous writings and speeches.   Sanism, he tells us, is irrational25
prejudice against the mentally disabled.  It is, as Michael has described it, “The Hidden
9
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MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY26
ON TRIAL (2000).
“Hollow man lookin’ in a cotton field / For dignity.”  BOB DYLAN, Dignity, on27
BOB DYLAN’S GREATEST HITS, VOL. 3 (1994).
-10-
Prejudice.”   Sanism is just like any other prejudice.  We are prejudiced against some26
people because we don’t like the way they look, the way they think, or the way they act. 
They are different from us, and we know we are superior to them in looks, in thought, or
in the way we act.  We are right, and they are wrong.  We know that we are better than
they are; therefore, they must be inferior.  
Africans were never treated as equals.  Their religion, their culture, their
civilization was deemed primitive.  And so, as superior beings from an advanced society,
we enslaved them–a whole race of people–so that their cheap labor could enable our
cotton to be picked.   When slavery ended, we mandated that African Americans be kept27
separate and unequal.  We could not risk that they co-mingle with those of us who were
superior beings.  Did you think that only the Nazis were concerned about the need to
maintain the purity of the Aryan race? 
Women were the weaker sex.  Surely they were not fit to vote or work.  A
woman’s place was in the home.  Their role was limited to cooking, cleaning,
childbearing, and child rearing.  After all, they promised to love, honor, and especially to
obey their superior male counterparts.      
Gay people engage in conduct that we view as not merely unacceptable but as 
10
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The movie is: The Passion of the Christ, whose gross box office receipts were 28
over $145 million in its first week of distribution in the United States and over $354
million in the six and one-half week period between Ash Wednesday, when it opened,
and Easter Sunday.  David Germain, ‘Passion” Returns to Top Spot Over Easter
Weekend, THE TRIBUNE (San Luis Obispo, CA), Apr. 12, 2004, at B5.  This box office
total more than doubles the $160 million reportedly raised by President George W. Bush
in several months of fund-raising to support his campaign for re-election.  See Mark
12:17:  “And Jesus said to them, ‘Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s; and to
God the things that are God’s.’  And they were amazed at Him.”   See also Matthew
22:21-22. 
-11-
perverted.  Not that long ago, homosexuality was characterized as a mental disorder.  If
unchallenged, the gay lifestyle threatens the very core of our religious beliefs.  And so we
love the sinner, but hate the sin.  Unfortunately, most of us tend to equate the perceived
sinner with the perceived sin.   
We hate Jews because they deny the deity of Christ.  It seems like only yesterday
that Jews were portrayed as Christ killers.  As a matter of fact, it was only yesterday–in
the most popular movie of 2004.28
Surely the mentally ill are appropriate targets for our prejudice.  After all, they are
mentally “ill,” and we are mentally healthy.  They are mentally “disabled,” and we are
mentally able.  They are mentally “disordered”–their thinking is irrational–and our
thinking is always well-ordered and rational.  They must be inferior beings.  We know
their disordered thinking makes them dangerous.  Don’t try to confuse us with recent
studies confirming that psychotic symptoms, such as delusions or hallucinations, currently
11
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MacARTHUR RESEARCH NETWORK ON MENTAL HEALTH AND THE29
LAW, MacARTHUR VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY, Executive Summary
(April 2001), at http://macarthur.virginia.edu/risk.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2005).  See
also Henry J. Steadman et al. Violence by People Discharged from Acute Psychiatric
Inpatient Facilities and by Others in the Same Neighborhoods, 55 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 393, 400 (1998) (reporting that the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment
Study found that the prevalence of violence among ex-mental patients without symptoms
of substance abuse and others living in the same neighborhoods without symptoms of
substance abuse was statistically indistinguishable); Bruce G. Link et al., The Violent and
Illegal Behavior of Mental Patients Reconsidered, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 275, 290 (!992)
(finding that the risk of violence from mentally disabled people–even people who are
currently experiencing psychotic symptoms–is “comparable to the risks associated with
common social statuses [e.g., male gender, young age, limited education] and a trivial
contribution to the overall level of violent/illegal behavior in American society”).
Consensus Development Conference on Antipsychotic Drugs and Obesity and30
Diabetes, 27 DIABETES CARE 596 (2004).  Participants in the conference included the
American Diabetes Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the North
American Association for the Study of Obesity, and the American Association of Clinical
Endocrinologists.
-12-
being experienced by a person, do not elevate his or her risk of violence.   We know29
better.  Every day, or so it seems, we read about some crazy person committing a horrible
crime and avoiding punishment by hiring a clever lawyer who uses a dishonest
psychiatrist to successfully hoodwink the jury into finding the defendant not guilty by
reason of insanity.  
And even those mentally disabled people who aren’t dangerous, they need to take
their medicine so they don’t walk around the streets annoying us by their panhandling and
their strange talk.  Why don’t they just get jobs and live a normal life?  Don’t try to
confuse us with recent studies linking an increased risk of diabetes, obesity, and heart
disease to the use of Clozaril, Resperidal, Zyprexa and other antipsychotic medications30
12
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Gardiner Harris, FDA: Antidepressants Can Lead to Suicide, SAN DIEGO31
UNION-TRIBUNE, Mar. 23, 2004; New Warning Urged About Depression Medication,
THE TRIBUNE (San Luis Obispo, CA), Mar. 23, 2004, at A3.
BOB DYLAN, The Times They Are A-Changin’, on THE TIMES THEY ARE A-32
CHANGIN’ ALBUM (1964).
For those readers who may be unaware of Michael’s attraction to the words of33
Bob Dylan, let me merely note that beginning in 1996 (with three articles in that year
alone), the prolific Michael Perlin has consistently used Bob Dylan song titles or lyrics in
the titles of the numerous law review articles he has written.  In the text of his articles,
Michael always explains the applicability of Dylan’s words to the subject upon which
Michael is writing.  See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “The Executioner’s Face is Always Well-
Hidden”: The Role of Counsel and Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y. SCH. L.
REV.201 (1996); Michael L. Perlin, “I’ll Give You Shelter From the Storm”: Privilege,
Confidentiality, and Confessions of Crime, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1699 (1996); Michael
L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, supra note 15, at 114.   
-13-
or that link an increased risk of suicide to the use of Paxil, Prozac, Zoloft and other anti-
depressant SSRIs.   We know these are powerful, mind-altering drugs, but these people31
are crazy and they need these drugs to make them sane.  These drugs are all FDA-
approved, and we trust their doctors to weigh the risks and benefits and to prescribe them
only when appropriate for use by their patients. 
Although our society is far from perfect, at least we have made some progress in
combating, though not eradicating, discrimination.  “The times they are a changin’”.   (It32
would not be possible to pay tribute to Michael Perlin without at least some mention of
the lyrics of Bob Dylan).   Today, African American children attend, and are even33
welcomed, at schools and universities throughout America, and Rosa Parks no longer sits
in the back of the Birmingham bus.  Today, when women graduate college–and they
13
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19 Genesis 24: “Then the LORD rained upon Sodom and upon Gomorrah34
brimstone and fire from the LORD out of heaven . . . .”
It should be noted, however, that six months after same-sex marriages began35
being performed in San Francisco, the California Supreme Court ruled that city and
county officials lacked authority to issue marriage licenses to, solemnize marriages of,
and register certificates of marriage for same-sex couples; and that marriages conducted
between same-sex couples in violation of the applicable statutes were void and of no legal
effect.  Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 499 (Cal. 2004).
BOB DYLAN, The Groom’s Still Waiting at the Altar, on SHOT OF LOVE36
ALBUM (1981).
-14-
graduate in numbers that equal, if not surpass, their male counterparts–and find
employment, they are no longer automatically relegated to the secretarial pool.  Just last
year, all across this country–from San Francisco in the west to New Paltz in the east–more
than 4,000 gay couples exchanged vows of marriage.  And no, San Francisco, that Sodom
of the West, and New Paltz, that Gomorrah of the East, have not yet been destroyed by
fire and brimstone,  or even by a simple earthquake.     34 35
But progress in combating discrimination against the mentally disabled?  “Th[at]
groom’s still waiting at the altar.”   Why do lawyers advocate zealously for criminal36
defendants charged with child molestation or serial murder, but not for a mentally
disabled person who faces involuntary confinement when he or she has committed no
crime?  Why do lawyers advocate zealously for Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, or
for John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo, but not for a mentally disabled person
who merely wishes to exercise the right to refuse psychotropic medication?  
Lawyers who represent the mentally disabled in civil commitment proceedings
14
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Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).37
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don’t believe they are prejudiced against their clients.  In fact, the possibility that their
sanist beliefs may cause them to roll over and play dead in civil commitment proceedings
does not even enter their conscious thought.  Our society, and I include lawyers and
judges as members of our society, characterizes mental disorder through a medical model. 
Mentally “ill” people are sick, and because they are “out of their minds,” they do not
realize that they need medicine to make them well, so that they will again be “in their
right minds.”  And who can tell us whether a person is mentally ill and needs to be
hospitalized for inpatient treatment?  Obviously, doctors are the experts on diagnosing
illness, not lawyers or judges.  
Even though the Supreme Court has acknowledged that involuntary
hospitalization, especially when accompanied by coerced treatment, is “a massive
curtailment of liberty,”  somehow we don’t view an adversarial proceeding as37
appropriate when the curtailment of liberty is not for the purpose of punishing a criminal,
but rather, for the purpose of treating a person’s mental illness in order to make him or
her well.  And so we defer to the doctors.  Tell us doctor, is the proposed patient suffering
from a mental illness?  Tell us doctor, is the proposed patient’s mental illness sufficiently
severe that the person satisfies our vaguely worded commitment statute requiring danger
to self or others or inability to provide for one’s basic necessities?  Did the doctor answer
“yes” to both questions?  Case closed. 
15
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In 1966, Fred Cohen wrote an article describing the lawyer who represents a38
proposed patient in a typical civil commitment hearing as “a stranger in a strange land
without benefit of guidebook, map, or dictionary.”  Fred Cohen, The Function of the
Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 TEX. L. REV. 424, 424 (1966). 
Over the years, several articles have echoed a similar theme–that the lawyer representing
a mentally disordered client is uncertain whether to choose a “best interest” role model
(i.e., the lawyer should determine the client’s best interests and pursue those interests in
the civil commitment or other hearing involving the client) or the traditional, adversarial
model (i.e., the client should make the ultimate decisions on all matters and the lawyer
should advocate the position expressly favored by his or her client).  Most of these
articles have discussed the role of counsel in civil commitment proceedings.  See, e.g.,
Michael Blinick, Mental Disability, Legal Ethics, and Professional Responsibility, 33
ALB. L. REV. 92 (1968); Elliot Andalman & David Chambers, Effective Counsel for
Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey, a Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 MISS. L.J.
43 (1974); Thomas R. Litwack, The Role of Counsel in Civil Commitment Proceedings:
Emerging Problems, 62 CAL. L. REV. 816 (1974); Note, The Role of Counsel in the Civil
Commitment Process: A Theoretical Framework, 84 YALE L. J. 1540 (1975); Michael L.
Perlin & Robert L. Sadoff, Ethical Issues in the Representation of Individuals in the
Commitment Process, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161 (Summer 1982); Virginia
Aldige Hiday, The Attorney’s Role in Involuntary Civil Commitment, 60 N.C. L. REV.
1027 (1982); Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of
Counsel in Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 39 (1992); Donald H.
Stone, Giving a Voice to the Silent Mentally Ill Client: An Empirical Study of the Role of
Counsel in the Civil Commitment Hearing, 70 UMKC L. REV. 603 (2002).  Most of
these articles contain or cite data demonstrating that legal representation of the mentally
disordered client in the civil commitment context is inadequate and assert that lawyers
should apply the traditional adversarial model in representing their mentally disordered
clients.  
Michael L. Perlin, supra note 1, at manuscript p. 14.  39
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Although many articles have been written about the inadequacy of counsel in civil
commitment proceedings,  surprisingly, as Michael mentions in his article,  almost38 39
nothing has been written about the inadequacy of counsel in right to refuse medication
16
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Among the few articles written on the subject are: Michael L. Perlin, “Salvation”40
or a “Lethal Dose”?  Attitudes and Advocacy in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, __ J.
FORENS. PSYCHOL. PRAC. ___ (2004) (in print); Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 15, at
114 (1996); Melvin Shaw, Professional Responsibility of Attorneys Representing
Institutionalized Mental Patients in Relation to Psychotropic Medications, 22 J.
HEALTH & HOSP. L. 186 (1989). 
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990).  See also Riggins v.41
Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the
forcing of antipsychotic medication on criminal defendants held for trial “absent a finding
of overriding justification and a determination of medical appropriateness”); Sell v.
United States, 539 U.S. 166, 178-83 (2003) (discussing and relying upon Harper and
Riggins as setting the framework for determining whether and under what circumstances
the government may forcibly administer antipsychotic medication to render a criminal
defendant competent to stand trial).  See Grant H. Morris, Mental Disorder and the
Civil/Criminal Distinction, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1177, 1197-207 (2004) (critiquing
the Sell decision).
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hearings–a striking, near-total lack of attention.   I am not surprised.  Here again, the40
medical model is used, this time to determine what medication is appropriate to treat the
person’s mental illness.  Who can tell us what medication is appropriate to treat our
involuntarily confined mental patient?  Obviously, doctors are the experts in prescribing
medication, not lawyers or judges.
Even though the Supreme Court has acknowledged that a mentally ill person–in
fact, even a mentally ill, sentence-serving prisoner–“possesses a significant liberty
interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs,”  again, we41
don’t view an adversarial proceeding as appropriate when the curtailment of that liberty
interest is not for the purpose of  punishing a criminal, but rather, for the purpose of
treating the person’s mental illness in order to make him or her well.  And so we defer to
17
Morris:
Published by Digital USD, 2005
See, e.g., Riese v. St. Mary’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 201, 21042
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that in nonemergency situations, antipsychotic medication
cannot be administered to involuntarily committed civil patients without their consent
absent a judicial determination of their incapacity to make treatment decisions); Rogers v.
Comm’r, 458 N.E.2d 308, 314 (Mass. 1983) (holding that involuntarily committed civil
patients do not lose the right to make treatment decisions unless they are adjudicated
incompetent by a judge in incompetency proceedings); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337,
342, 342-44 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that involuntary civil commitment, without more, does
-18-
the doctors.  Tell us doctor, is the medication that you are prescribing for this patient
medically appropriate for the patient’s condition despite any potential side effects that the
patient may experience?  Would a rational person take that medication despite those
potential side effects?  Did the doctor answer “yes” to both questions?  Case closed.
But deference to doctors is not the only reason the right to refuse treatment is not
taken seriously.  In addition to a medical judgment that the proposed treatment is
appropriate, there has also been a legal judgment that this person’s mental illness is
sufficiently serious to warrant his or her placement in a mental hospital for treatment.  In
essence, the civil commitment decision gives a legal imprimatur–a seal of approval–to the
person’s status as less than a full-fledged human being.  We don’t need to listen to this
person’s objections to treatment–no matter how rational those objections are–because we
believe that the civil commitment decision “proved” that his or her ideas, concerns, and
worries are not worthy of our consideration.  
Despite numerous appellate court decisions holding that a person’s incompetence
to make treatment refusal decisions is not established by a decision to involuntarily civil
commit that person and that a separate hearing on that issue is required,  we do not42
18
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not establish that the committed person lacks the mental capacity to comprehend the
consequences of medication refusal decisions and that a judicial determination that the
patient lacks that capacity is required before the state may administer antipsychotic drugs
over the patient’s objection).  Utilizing the informed consent doctrine, “virtually every
court that has considered the matter now recognizes a ‘right to refuse’ psychotropic
medication for institutionalized populations.”  RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND
THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 923 (4th ed.
2004).
Perlin, supra note 1, at manuscript p. 3.43
Id. at manuscript p.21.44
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accept the separate hearing requirement as anything but a meaningless and unnecessary,
formalistic impediment to treatment.   If mental illness alone does not equate with
incompetence, then surely a decision to civilly commit the mentally ill person must
equate.  After all, the court has ordered this person placed in a mental hospital, and
hospitals are for treatment.  We can’t allow this sick patient to transform the hospital into
a prison, remaining there untreated for an indefinite period of time.  Obviously, we
conclude, the doctor’s medical judgment on what treatment should be administered
should trump the involuntary mental patient’s claim of a legal right to refuse treatment.
III.  Will Competent Counsel Be an Adequate Remedy?
To change this purely theoretical right–this “paper” right, as Michael characterizes
it  into a right with a real remedy, Michael recommends that organized and regularized43
counsel be appointed–lawyers who are specifically trained to represent individual mental
patients who assert a right to refuse treatment.   “[T]he presence of adequate counsel,” he44
informs us, “is of critical importance in the disposition of right to refuse treatment
19
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Id. at manuscript, p. 19.45
Id.46
In re K.G.F., 29 P.3d 485 (Mont. 2001).47
Perlin, supra note 1, at manuscript p. 26.  In fact, only one case has even cited48
K.G.F. in the three and one-half years since it was decided.  In that case, the Court of
Appeals of Washington specifically rejected K.G.F.’s refusal to presume the effective
assistance of counsel in the civil commitment context, asserting: “We do not share the
Montana Supreme Court’s dim view of the quality of civil commitment proceedings, or
their adversarial nature, in the state of Washington.”  In re T.A. H.-L., 97 P.3d 767, 771
-20-
cases.”   Just as with civil commitment cases, the quality of counsel is “the single most45
important factor”  in the decisions that are reached in those cases.  A mentally disabled46
person will be fully valued as a member of our society only if a competent lawyer
vigorously advocates for him or her in any legal proceeding in which that person is
involved.  
Is Michael right?  Yes, of course he is.  However, I qualify my affirmative
response with a large asterisk.  What if Michael rallies lawyers to his cause?  What if they
do start advocating aggressively for the mentally disabled?  What if they demonstrate that
some mentally disabled patients are competent to give or withhold their consent to
psychotropic medication?  What if courts follow lead of the Montana Supreme Court in
its landmark K.G.F.  decision, requiring that counsel for the mentally disabled be47
competent and imposing specific performance standards on them to assure that they are
competent–although, as Michael tells us, not a single court in any of the other forty-nine
states has yet done so since that case was decided?   Surely, if this happens, mental48
20
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(Wash. Ct. App. 2004). 
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act III, sc. 2.49
For those, like Michael, who demand a Dylan fix for every quotation, I offer this50
more succinct, but less dramatic, alternative: “She knows there’s no success like failure /
And that failure is no success at all.”  BOB DYLAN, Love Minus Zero/No Limit, on
BRINGING IT ALL BACK HOME ALBUM (1965).
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990).  See supra note 41.51
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH §10-708 (2000) (using a medical review52
panel); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-57(e) (2003) (using a second physician to review the
professional judgment of the treating physician); Catherine E. Blackburn, The
“Therapeutic Orgy” and the “Right to Rot” Collide: The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic
Drugs Under State Law, 27 HOUS. L. REV. 447, 479 & n.101, 493 & n.147 (1990)
(citing fourteen states that use a medical decision maker model and eighteen states that
use a judicial decision maker model to decide  whether an involuntarily committed mental
patient’s treatment refusal will be upheld).
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patients who assert a right to refuse treatment will be more successful in the court
proceedings in which their competency to decide is in issue. 
 Michael will have succeeded, but will he be satisfied by the success he has
achieved?   In the words of Lady Macbeth, “Naught’s had, all’s spent, where our desire is
got without content.”   (Did you think that Bob Dylan is the only source of literary49
inspiration?).   Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged that involuntarily50
confined mental patients “possess[] a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted
administration of antipsychotic drugs,”  many states do not require a court hearing to51
determine the patient’s competence as a due process protection to enforce that right. 
Those states use a medical decision maker model, allowing a staff psychiatrist or hospital
committee to make an informal judgment of the patient’s competence.   In essence, the52
21
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In Harper, 494 U.S. at 227, the Supreme Court held: “[T]he Due Process Clause53
permits the State to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with
antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and
the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.”  Further, the Harper Court ruled that the
prisoner was not entitled to a judicial hearing to determine whether he was competent to
refuse medication.  Id. at 222, 226, 228.  The Court upheld administrative hearing
procedures in which a hearing committee, composed of a psychiatrist, psychologist, and
the associate superintendent of the facility reviews the medical treatment decision.  Id. at
215, 232-33.  In Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003), the Supreme Court, relying
on its Harper decision, 123 S. Ct. at 2183, upheld the involuntary administration of
antipsychotic medication on a criminal defendant who was incompetent to stand trial
provided the treatment was medically appropriate, was substantially unlikely to have side
effects that could undermine the fairness of the trial, and was necessary to significantly
further important governmental, trial-related interests.  123 S. Ct. at 2184.  Additionally,
the Sell Court held that conditions that limit forced medication to restore trial competence
need not be considered if forced medication is warranted for a different purpose–such as
when the defendant lacks the mental competence to make the treatment decision or when
the patient’s failure to accept medication poses a risk of injury to the patient or to others. 
123 S. Ct. at 2185.  Although Harper involved a sentence-serving, mentally ill prisoner
and Sell involved a criminal defendant who was incompetent to stand trial, the two cases
suggest that the Supreme Court is likely to uphold the constitutionality of a medical
decision maker model in right to refuse treatment situations involving civilly committed
patients.
-22-
patient’s liberty interest–i.e., his or her legal interest–in avoiding the unwanted
administration of antipsychotic drugs is converted into a determination of the patient’s
medical interest as that interest is measured by the patient’s physician or a hospital
committee reviewing that physician’s decision.   Competent and zealous advocacy by53
patients’ attorneys in right to refuse treatment court hearings will not vindicate these
patients’ right to refuse treatment because, in these states, there are no court hearings to
determine the patients’ competence to refuse treatment.
What about those states, including the nation’s five most populous states
22
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See Wenona Y. Whitfield, Capacity, Competency, and Courts: The Illinois54




(California, Texas, New York, Florida, and Illinois), that require a formal hearing on the
patient’s competence before a judge or other independent, law-trained decision maker? 
Surely, one could assert, competent and zealous advocacy by patients’ attorneys will have
a significant impact on the results of those hearings.  For example, for the calendar years
2000 and 2001 combined, a total of 687 hearings were conducted in Illinois to determine
patient competence to refuse treatment.   In only fifty-six of those hearings, did the54
patient prevail.   Thus, under current practice in Illinois, patients were successful in only55
8.2 percent of right to refuse treatment cases.  If attorneys adequately prepared their cases
and argued them vigorously, they should be able to achieve a much higher success rate for
their clients.  Perhaps 100, or 150, or even 200 patients will prevail.  But is this the
appropriate measure of success?
During the two-year period in which 687 competency hearings were conducted in
Illinois, there were a total of 23,035 patients in the state’s mental health centers.   Thus56
22,348 patients, i.e., over ninety-seven percent of the total, did not have competency
hearings.  These 22,348 patients did not have lawyers to assist them because they did not
protest their doctors’ orders.  There were no competency hearings for these patients
because psychiatrists assume that patients who accept treatment are competent to do so. 
23
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See Grant H. Morris, Judging Judgment: Assessing the Competence of Mental57
Patients to Refuse Treatment, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 343, 384-431 (1995) (reporting
on my experience as a mental health hearing officer in right to refuse treatment cases).
Id. at 426.58
-24-
Because the right to refuse treatment is not self-executing, these patients had no lawyers
to demand that psychiatrists meet their information disclosure obligation before patient
consent to treatment was obtained.  Michael’s proposal for competent and zealous
attorney advocacy focuses narrowly on the 687 patients who refused treatment, not more
broadly on the 22,348 who accepted it.  
And yet, does anyone really believe that all of these 22,348 patients gave their
voluntary, informed, and competent consent to treatment with psychotropic medication?  
When psychiatrists are asked whether they inform patients of the potential risks and
benefits of, and alternatives to, the proposed treatment, they typically answer in the 
affirmative.  However, in many right to refuse treatment hearings that I conducted in
California,  psychiatrists testified that they informed patients only about medication57
benefits.   For example, in one case, the psychiatrist testified that he told the patient “that58
haloperidol would help reduce her feelings of anxiety and would reduce some or all of her
hostility.” In another case, the psychiatrist testified that he informed the patient that “she
would feel less agitated and that her thinking would improve if she agreed to
medications.”  In another case, the psychiatrist simply stated: “I informed the patient that
medication would be necessary to help her with her distress and encouraged her to take
24
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Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1,10 (1972).59
The California Supreme Court summarized the physician's disclosure duty as60
follows: 
In sum, the patient's right of self-decision is the measure of the physician's
duty to reveal. That right can be effectively exercised only if the patient
possesses adequate information to enable an intelligent choice. The scope of
the physician's communications to the patient, then, must be measured by
the patient's need, and that need is whatever information is material to the
decision. Thus the test for determining whether a potential peril must be




Even when psychiatrists did discuss risks, they did not divulge “all information
relevant to a meaningful decisional process” –the test of disclosure imposed by the59
California Supreme Court.  To obtain a patient's informed consent, that test requires the
psychiatrist to divulge all risks that are material to the patient's decision.   Sometimes60
psychiatrists spoke about risks in general terms, informing patients that any medication
can have detrimental as well as beneficial effects.  At other times, psychiatrists discussed
some side effects but not others.  Typically, the psychiatrist would inform the patient of
non-neurological side effects such as sedation or anticholinergic side effects, i.e., dry
mouth, blurred vision, urinary retention, and constipation, but would omit any discussion
of neurological side effects such as dystonia, Parkinsonism, akathisia, akinesia, and
tardive dyskinesia.  Obviously, if the risk of non-neurological side effects is material to a
patient's decision, the risk of neurological side effects is likely to be even more so.
25
Morris:
Published by Digital USD, 2005
-26-
When psychiatrists disclosed the risk of neurological side effects, they usually sugar-
coated the information.  I deliberately chose the word “sugar-coated.”  In one hearing I
conducted, in response to my question: “Did you treat the patient with antipsychotic
medication during this admission?,” the psychiatrist testified: “No and yes. I managed to
sweet talk him into taking Navane a couple of times–three days in a row.”
 Sometimes psychiatrists testified that they used a written advisement to inform
patients about medication side effects.  Typically, those so-called consent forms contained
no information about risks but merely asserted that the prescribing physician had provided
information about medication risks and benefits.  Often those forms were used
ritualistically to substitute for the process of obtaining informed consent rather than as
evidence that informed consent was, in fact, obtained.
Based on the testimony I heard as a decision maker in right to refuse treatment
hearings, I would have to say that nondisclosure or, at best, inadequate disclosure of risks
was the norm; full disclosure was the rare exception.  This failure of full disclosure is not
established, however–in fact, it is not even an issue–if the patient does not refuse
treatment and no hearing is conducted.  For most patients, no hearing is conducted
because most patients obediently accept–or are coerced into accepting–medication that
their psychiatrists prescribe.  Don’t expect your psychiatrist to come up here and fully
discuss risks with you.  He’s far too busy doing other things.  “Johnny’s in the basement
26
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BOB DYLAN, Subterranean Homesick Blues, on BRINGING IT ALL BACK61
HOME ALBUM (1965).  Perhaps another Bob Dylan lyric is equally appropriate to
characterize the failure of psychiatrists to communicate to their patients the risks of
medication they are prescribing: “We never did too much talkin’ anyway.”  BOB
DYLAN, Don’t Think Twice, It’s All Right, on THE FREEWHEELIN’ BOB DYLAN
ALBUM (1963).
The National Coalition for the Homeless reports these crimes as typical offenses62
charged against homeless people, at
http://www.nationalhomeless.org/civilrights/crim2003/index.html (last visited Feb. 11,
2005).
See generally Paul F. Stavis, Why Prisons Are Brim-Full of the Mentally Ill: Is63
Their Incarceration a Solution or a Sign of Failure 11 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J.
157 (2000); see also Abramson, supra note 7, at 103(asserting that mentally disordered
individuals are often arrested and prosecuted for nuisance offenses as a convenient and
-27-
mixing up the medicine.”  61
And even in those relatively few cases in which lawyers competently and zealously
represent patients who refuse treatment, what is the likely result?  What happens if the
patient is found competent to refuse treatment?  Do you think that psychiatrists and
hospital administrators will allow that patient to remain at their hospital–taking up
valuable bed space while refusing treatment?  No way.  We’ll just release the patient.  But
when his or her mental disorder kicks up again, and he or she comes to the attention of
the police, we won’t accept this person as a patient.  Instead, he or she will be charged
with some petty crime–e.g., obstruction of the sidewalks or public places, loitering,
aggressive solicitation, or, if we’re in Santa Barbara, leaning against a building or a
store.   This mentally disabled person will be processed through the criminal justice62
system.   Think of it.  The three largest hospitals in the United States for the treatment of63
27
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more reliable alternative to assure their involuntary detention than the LPS civil
commitment process).
Stavis, supra note 63, at 159 (citing E. Fuller Torrey, Jails and64
Prisons–America’s New Mental Hospitals, 85 J. PUB. HEALTH 1611, 1611-13 (1995).
See Michael L. Perlin, “On Desolation Row”: The Blurring of the Borders65
Between Civil and Criminal Mental Disability Law, and What It Means to All of Us,
manuscript p. 24 (keynote address presented at the annual meeting of the American
Association of Psychiatry and the Law, Newport Beach, CA, Oct.. 2002 ) (manuscript of
address available from the author) (noting that mental health courts “identify mentally ill,
non-violent offenders and order or sentence them to receive mental health services in lieu
of confinement in a jail or prison”); Debra Baker, Special Treatment: A One-of-a-Kind
Court May Offer the Best Hope for Steering Nonviolent Mentally Ill Defendants into Care
Instead of Jail, 84 A.B.A. J. 20 (June 1998) (describing the first such mental health court,
established in Broward County, Florida). 
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serious mental illness are not hospitals at all.  Rather, they are the three largest jails in the
country: Riker’s Island in New York City, the Cook County Jail in Chicago, and the Los
Angeles County Jail.   And after this person has gone through this revolving door a64
number of times, when he or she is arrested yet again, maybe he or she will be fortunate
enough to be diverted to a newly-created mental health court where the judge will
propose a deal that the person cannot refuse: If you agree to take your medicine, you
won’t go to jail for this latest offense.    65
California has another option.  Under LPS, if a person, as a result of mental
disorder, is believed to be a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled,
he or she may be detained for an initial seventy-two-hour evaluation period.  Thereafter,
the person may be certified for a fourteen-day intensive treatment period if any of these
three criteria is determined to exist.  If the patient refuses treatment, a competency
28
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CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5352 (West 1998).66
Id. § 5352.1 (authorizing the court to issue an ex parte order establishing a67
temporary conservatorship pending the determination of the petition for a
conservatorship).  The powers granted to a temporary conservator may be as broad as the
powers granted to a conservator.  Id. § 5353.  
Id. § 5358(a)(2), (b).  See supra text accompanying notes 17-21.68
STATISTICS & DATA ANALYSIS, CA. DEP’T OF MENTAL HEALTH,69
Involuntary Detention Data–Fiscal Year 2000-01(July 1, 2000-June 30, 2001), at
www.dmh.cahwnet.gov/SADA/docs/Involuntary-Detention-Data/Rep0001_FINAL.pdf
(last visited Feb. 11, 2005).  
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hearing is conducted during this fourteen-day period.  If the patient is found to have the
mental capacity to refuse treatment, the hospital can immediately initiate conservatorship
proceedings.   And once the person is placed on a conservatorship–or even a temporary66
conservatorship before the full hearing is conducted –the conservator can consent to the67
administration of medication over the patient’s objection.   68
How popular is this option?  In the most current report available,  the California69
Department of Mental Health discloses that in the 2000-2001 fiscal year, 125,895 adults
were detained on seventy-two-hour evaluation holds as dangerous to self, dangerous to
others, or gravely disabled.  Of that number, 51,268 were detained on fourteen-day
intensive treatment certifications.  How many of those people were detained for a 180-day
period as demonstrably dangerous to others?  You will be delighted to learn that only
sixty met that standard.  Think of it: For a whole year, after only seventeen days or less of
inpatient hospitalization, there were only sixty dangerously mentally ill people in the
29
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Involuntary outpatient commitment, euphemistically called “assisted outpatient70
treatment,” is another example demonstrating that society’s preferred, and perhaps its 
“final solution” for the problem of the mentally disabled, is coerced treatment with
psychotropic medication.  Under recently enacted statutes patterned after New York’s
Kendra’s Law, a mentally disabled person can be required to take psychotropic
medication while living in the community, and if the person does not comply, her or she
may be involuntarily hospitalized.  See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(n)
(McKinney 2002).  Critics contend that these laws, by coercing noncivilly committed
persons to accept treatment under threat of institutionalization, erode fundamental human
rights and the process by which these rights are protected in the courts.  See, e.g., Erin
O’Connor, Is Kendra’s Law a Keeper?  How Kendra’s Law Erodes Fundamental Rights
of the Mentally Ill, 11 J.L. & POL’Y 313, 342-49 (2002); Kristina M. Campbell, Note,
Blurring the Lines of the Danger Zone: The Impact of Kendra’s Law on the Rights of the
Nonviolent Mentally Ill, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 173, 185-87,
192-98 (2000); Michael L. Perlin, supra note 65 at manuscript pp. 11-14.  Critics of
statutes establishing involuntary outpatient commitment might well agree with Bob
Dylan’s assessment of the legislative process: “Fools making laws for the breaking of
jaws / And the sound of the keys as they clink / But there’s no time to think.”  BOB
DYLAN, No Time to Think, on STREET LEGAL ALBUM (1978). 
-30-
entire state of California.  But many of those who were initially detained as dangerous to
others were suddenly found to be gravely disabled and processed through the LPS
conservatorship route.  For fiscal year 2000-2001, a total of 7,198 conservatorships were
established.  When the legal standard and procedural safeguards for lengthy civil
commitment and coerced treatment is perceived as too protective of the mentally
disabled–too difficult for us to achieve–we simply bypass them and substitute an
alternative, but far easier route to reach the desired result.
Our sanist society will continue to find ways to require the mentally disabled to act
as obedient children and take their medicine.   Even if lawyers do advocate vigorously70
for their clients in individual right to refuse treatment cases, little will change.  The goal,
30
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BOB DYLAN, Just Like Tom Thumb’s Blues, on HIGHWAY 61 REVISITED71
ALBUM (1965). 
In tribute to Michael Perlin:72
              May you grow up to be righteous,
              May you grow up to be true,
              May you always know the truth
              And see the lights surrounding you
              May you always be courageous,
              Stand upright and be strong
              And may you stay forever young.
-31-
the objective, the prize, as Michael knows so well, is not the vindication of the right to
refuse psychotropic medication for the few mentally disabled clients who are courageous
enough to raise that issue and whose lawyers advocate vigorously for them.  The goal, the
objective, the real prize is acceptance of mentally disabled individuals as people, with the
same rights that other people have–the end of discrimination against the mentally
disabled; the end of sanism.  Sadly, zealous lawyer advocacy in individual right to refuse
treatment cases will move us only marginally toward that goal. 
The failure of lawyers, judges, psychiatrists, and society to treat mentally disabled
people as people–i.e., with dignity and respect–has left me dejected, depressed, even
despondent.  As Bob Dylan wrote, in the quotation that Michael recited in his article, “I
don’t have the strength / To get up and take another shot.”   71
But not so for Michael Perlin.  He remains defiant, determined, and most of all,
devoted.  Just like Don Quixote de la Mancha, this gallant knight remains dedicated to his
cause.   He continues to speak, and to write, and to hope.   He pursues justice  for the72 73 74
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BOB DYLAN, Forever Young, on PLANET WAVES ALBUM (1974).
Miguel de Cervantes:  “When life itself seems lunatic, who knows where73
madness lies? . . .  Too much sanity may be madness.  And maddest of all, to see life as it
is and not as it should be.” DALE WASSERMAN, MAN OF LA MANCHA (1965). 
“Justice, justice shalt thou pursue, that thou mayest live, and inherit the land74
which the LORD thy God giveth thee.”  16 Deuteronomy 20.
I saw a man pursuing the horizon;75
  Round and round they sped. 
  I was disturbed at this;  
  I accosted the man. 
  “It is futile,” I said,
   “You can never–“   
  “You lie,” he cried, 
  And ran on.
STEPHEN CRANE, POEMS OF STEPHEN CRANE 15 (Gerald D. McDonald, ed.
1964).
PAUL SIMON & ART GARFUNKEL, The Sound of Silence, on THE SOUNDS76
OF SILENCE ALBUM (1964) (lyrics by Paul Simon). 
BOB DYLAN, Blowin’ in the Wind, on THE FREEWHEELIN’ BOB DYLAN77
ALBUM (1963).  Or as Bob Dylan phrased it twenty-seven years later, “She ain’t hearing
a thing, the silence is a-stickin’ her deep.”  BOB DYLAN, Cat’s in the Well, on UNDER
-32-
mentally disabled.   Although we do not hear him and do not heed him, he will continue75
his quest.  The windmills that Michael contests are not mere figments of his imagination. 
They are real and continuing problems.  Michael is an irresistible force.  But our
attitude–our prejudice–toward the mentally disabled may well be an immoveable object. 
How long will  Michael continue to speak in a forest, while we hear only “sounds of
silence”?   Or as Bob Dylan inquired: “[H]ow many ears must one man have / Before he76
can hear people cry?”  77
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